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NOTES AND COMMENT
sistent in treating this as reversible error." Ducate v. Brighton, 133
Wis. 628, 637, 114 N.W. 103.
Variance from the rule expressed in the above cases appears in
Ketchum v. Chgo. etc. R. Co., 150 Wis., 211, 136 N.W. 634, where
jurors requested and obtained from the attending court officer, not the
judge, the measurements of certain railroad cars, the action being de-
nounced as improper, but being regarded as having had no effect upon
the verdict, especially in view of Section 274.37 Wis. Stat., which re-
quires an affirmative showing that error affected substantial rights of
the appellant. The statute referred to provided in part that no judg-
ment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted for any error
as to procedure unless the error complained of has affected substantial
rights of the party complaining. The retreat thereby marked from the
strict rule above exemplified met with dissent by Justice Timlin, who
feared the case as precedent and favored the granting of a new trial
due to the misconduct of the jury. Ketchum v. R. Co., 150 Wis. 211,
at pp. 220-222, 136 N.W. 634; see also Sedlack v. State, 141 Wis. 589,
592, 124 N.W. 510.
In cases involving communications of this kind, it is important that
distinction be made between communications had by the court with the
jury, and communications had by the jury with someone other than the
judge. The latter circumstance is open to interpretation as to whether
it constitutes "court procedure" within the meaning of the statute; and
on that basis the cases of Ketchum v. R. Co. and Sedlack v. State may
show a seeming rather than a real deviation from the ruling in Havenor
v. State and the cases cited therewith. At any rate, the instant case,
Hackbarth v. State, is a noteworthy departure in that where the evi-
dence as to guilt is strong, and backed by the defendant's own ad-
missions, it will outweigh a claim of prejudicial error.
RONALD A. PADWAY
Landlord and Tenant: Rental of Premises While Padlocked.
The plaintiffs in this action brought suit for the recovery of rent.
Two' separate leases involving different properties are the contracts
sued on, and are considered in separate actions, both of which are
herein discUssed. Rundle-Spence Mfg. Co. v. Jakopichek, Wis., 229
N.W. 550.
Defendant entered in a written lease for the premises known as No.
86 Second street, beginning July 1, 1924, and ending June 30, 1927,
by the terms of which lease he was to pay an annual rental of $1,200.
Jakopichek subleased the premises to Ignatz Pitzer and Leo Braun
for the entire period for a consideration amounting to $1,200 over and
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above that stipulated as the amount due from the defendant Jako-
pichek to Rundle-Spence & Co.
According to the terms of the lease the premises were to be used for
restaurant purposes and as a refreshment parlor. The rent was paid
on time until Nov. 11, 1925, when the premises were padlocked by
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin for the sale of intoxicating liquors an said premises by the
sub-lessees, Pitzer and Braun; and a permanent injunction was issued
out of said court, restraining and enjoining the plaintiffs and others,
their agents, servants, and assigns from keeping, using or occupying
said premises for a period of one year. That rent due during the pad-
lock injunction is sued for, the defendant entering as a defense knowl-
edge by the plaintiff of the violation of the law or at least of an intent
so to do when the lease was entered into. A cross complaint was
served upon defendants, Pitzer and Braun, by defendant Jackopichek.
The trial court held that Rundle-Spence & Co. could recover nothing
from any of the defendants and Jackopichek's cross complaint was
dismissed.
The other lease related to the premises known as No. 70 West Water
Street, and the amount of the rental for the first year was $1,620 and
for the second and third years was $1,740. The defendant subleased
the premises to one Haslacher on Feb. 9, 1924, for a consideration of
$1,700 over and above the rental reserved in the lease from the plaintiff
to Jakopichek. The padlocking took place on March 30, 1926, and
judgment was the same as in the first case, from which the plaintiff
appeals.
In the finding of the Supreme Court it was established that in each
case the sub-lessees had occupied the premises previous' to the leases
from Jakopichek, under subleases from the Waukesha Brewing Co.,
and also that the sub-lessees had been previously convicted of offenses
against the laws relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors.
A careful search of the record reveals nothing which would sup-
port a finding that at the time the lease was entered into, it was con-
templated by the plaintiff that a violation of prohibition law would
occur. Each lease contained the following clause, "Said lessee to use
said premises for refreshment parlors, to be operated in a peaceable
and quiet manner, and if the premises are used for anything else,
lease will be subject to cancellation by the lessor." There is no evidence
to show that the plaintiff in any way participated in illegal ventures
of the defendant. The rent was fair and reasonable, the plaintiff shar-
ing in no way any increased rent in the profit of the illicit sales made
by the defendant sub-lessees. If-a finding that the plaintiff participated
in any way in the illegal enterprises could be sustained in this case,
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such a finding would have to be sustained in every case where a land-
lord had grounds which would support a suspicion that his tenant might
engage in an illegal enterprise on the premises. A landlord cannot be
obliged to act on the supposition that every restaurant or refreshment
parlor is engaged in the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors as a matter
of fact. In the case of Harbison v. Shirley, 139 Iowa 605, 117 N.W.
963, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 662, it is held that a mere suspicion'by the land-
lord that there is or may be an offence committed is not sufficient to
defeat his right. There must be some form of connivance, however
slight, to render a contract void. Mere indifference as to the intended
use is not enough; his relation to the unlawful purposes must be active
in some degree, and until such connivance is shown, the lessee will be
held to the contract Tracy v. Tolmadge, 14 N.Y. 162; Chamberlain v.
Fischer, 117 Mich. 428; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. v. Mason, 44
Minn. 318; 9 L.R.A. 506; 46 N.W. 558.
Jakopichek, prior to entering into the real estate business in 1922,
had been a saloon keeper and had been convicted of a violation of the
prohibition law; he had intervened in the transaction in order to pro-
cure the lease from the plaintiff in the first instance, and quite clearly
took advantage of the situation so as to compel his sub-lessees to pay
a large amount for continued possession of the premises which he no
doubt contemplated that they would do because of the illicit business
which they might transact upon the premises. Clearly there is no other
way in which the large amount they were compelled to pay him above
the normal rental could be accounted for. The plaintiff did not in any
way participate in the transaction except to agree that the sub-lessees
might pay the rent directly to them.
The judgement in each case denying the plaintiff's right to recover
is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions
to enter judgment against defendant Jakopichek for the amount due
under the leases. The judgment dismissing the cross complaint of
defendant Jakopichek is affirmed.
CHARLES L. LARSON
Workmen's Compensation Act: Liability of Co-employees.
Third Parties-Plaintiff accepted compensation under Workmen's
Compensation Act for the death of her husband, which was occasioned
by a co-employee's negligence, and after being assigned the employer's
rights, sued the tort feasor.- Held: The acceptance of the award was
no bar to the action. McGonigle v. Gryphan, Wis., 229 N.W. 83.
The defendant is liable unless the relation of fellow workman or a
provision of the act exempts him. 18 R.C.L. 540. By the weight of
